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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT-PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS-The Supreme Court held that
the Endangered Species Act prohibits the modification of the
habitats of endangered and threatened animals.
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
The purpose of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (the "1973
Act") is to provide protection for endangered animals.' Under
the 1973 Act, a land acquisition program, conservation
programs, and a series of prohibitions have been established to
protect animals threatened with extinction.2 According to
Section 9 of the 1973 Act, it is unlawful for any person to
"take"3 an endangered or threatened animal.' In a federal
regulation used to enforce the 1973 Act, the Secretary of the
Interior (the "Secretary") defined "harm,"5 as it appears in the
definition of "take," to include any changes made to the
environment which kills or injures animals by damaging their
means of "breeding, feeding, or sheltering." '
The Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon
(the "Group") consists of small landowners, workers in logging
companies and families dependent on forest product industries.
1. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 115
S. Ct. 2407, 2409 (1995). According to the 1973 Act, "the purposes of ... [the Act]
are to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
threatened species depend may be conserved, to provide a program for the conserva-
tion of such endangered species and threatened species." Endangered Species Act of
1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1988).
2. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 1
F.3d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 1993), rev'd on rehearing, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'd,
115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
3. The 1973 Act defines "take" as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."
16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1988).
4. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2409-10.
5. Id. at 2410. "Harm" is defined as: "[An] act which actually kills or injures
wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or degradation where
it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral pat-
terns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1993).
6. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2410.
7. Id.
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The Group alleged that, by refraining from altering the
environment so as not to "harm" the red-cockaded woodpecker,
an endangered species, and the northern spotted owl, a
threatened species, the Group has caused themselves economic
hardship.8 The Group claimed that, in order to comply with the
definition of "harm" as set forth by the Secretary, the Group was
forced to lay off employees and limit income from trust lands.'
The Group filed a declaratory judgment action against the
Secretary in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia which challenged the Secretary's definition of "harm"
as set forth in the regulation." The Group argued that the
Secretary's definition of "harm" oversteps the intent and purpose
of the 1973 Act." The Group also claimed that the regulation is
void for vagueness. 2 The district court held that Congress
intended the language of the 1973 Act to be interpreted broadly
and the Secretary's definition of "harm" is reasonable. 3 The
court held that the 1973 Act includes any and all actions against
endangered animals." The district court cited previous cases
which upheld the Secretary's broad definition of "harm" and
dismissed the Group's complaint.
The Group appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia. 6  The Group claimed that the
8. Id.
9. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Lujan, 806 F.
Supp. 279, 282 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding that the Secretary's definition of "harm" is
consistent with the language and purpose of the Endangered Species Act), aftd sub
nom. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 1993), rev'd on rehearing, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct.
2407 (1995). By adhering to the Secretary's broad definition of "harm," which forbids
any change to the environment, the court noted that members of the Group were
unable to cut down trees to collect the wood necessary for their lumber businesses.
Sweet Home, 806 F. Supp. at 282. The Group argued that its inability to collect the
lumber decreased the supply of wood to sell to its clients which then reduced
members' incomes. Brief for Respondents at 5, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (No. 94-859), cert.
granted, 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
10. Sweet Home, 806 F. Supp. at 282.
11. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2411.
12. Sweet Home, 806 F. Supp. at 285. The Group claimed that the regulation
violates their property rights as protected by the Fifth Amendment. Id. The court
promptly dismissed this argument, noting that the regulation specifically describes
and limits the conduct it prohibits. Id. at 285-86.
13. Id. at 283.
14. Id.
15. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2411. The district court discussed Palila v.
Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding
that the Secretary's definition of harm, which includes alterations to an endangered
animal's habitat, is reasonable).
16. Sweet Home, 1 F.3d at 1.
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Secretary's broad definition of harm is contrary to the 1973 Act
and, in the alternative, the regulation is void for vagueness as to
the definition of "harm."7 The court of appeals affirmed the
judgment of the district court and held that the Secretary's
definition of "harm" is reasonable.18 The Group then petitioned
the court of appeals for a rehearing. 9 The court of appeals
granted the petition and reversed the decision of the district
court, finding that the context of the word "harm" directly
contradicts the broad interpretation given to it by the Secretary
and the lower court.20 The court held that "harm" should be
understood only in terms of the words used with it.2' The court
noted that the other words used in the definition of "harm"
describe an aggressor's direct application of force against an
endangered animal.22 The court cited other cases in which the
language of the federal regulation has been narrowly
interpreted.23 The court found that the nine verbs used in the
definition of "harm" all describe acts of direct force, a quality
missing from acts of habitat modification.2 Based on this
reasoning, the court of appeals held that the regulation, which
defines "harm" to include acts of altering the environment, is
invalid and that the judgment of the district court should be
reversed.2"
The Secretary then appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.2" The Supreme Court granted certiorari27 because the
17. Id. at 3-4. The Group argued that the Secretary's definition of "harm" vio-
lates the language of the 1973 Act which "clearly" demonstrates that Congress did
not mean for the 1973 Act to regulate habitat modification. Id. at 3.
18. Id. at 8. The court of appeals concluded that the Secretary had an "almost
infinite number of options available to him" when protecting an animal threatened
with extinction. Id. at 6.
19. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2411.
20. Id.
21. Id. The court based its holding on the canon of statutory construction
known as noscitur a sociis. Id. Noscitur a sociis maintains that a word's meaning is
realized by looking to the context of its usage. Id.
22. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 17
F.3d 1463, 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
23. Sweet Home, 17 F.3d at 1465 (citing United States v. Hayashi, 5 F.3d
1278, 1282, superseded by 22 F.3d 860 (9th Cir. 1993)). In Hayashi, the court held
that a person who fired his rifle into the water did not violate the 1973 Act because
his actions did not invade the animals' ordinary activities. Hayashi, 5 F.3d at 1283.
24. Sweet Home, 17 F.3d at 1465.
25. Id. at 1472.
26. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2407.
27. Id. A writ of certiorari is an order decreed by an appellate court which is
used by that court when it has the discretion on whether or not to hear an appeal
from a lower court. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1109 (6th ed. 1990). If the writ is
granted, the lower court is ordered to certify the record and send the record to the
higher court. Id.
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court of appeals' finding that the Secretary's interpretation of
the word "harm" was invalid conflicted with a decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which upheld the same
definition.28 The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
court of appeals based on the language and legislative history of
the 1973 Act.29 The Supreme Court held that the 1973 Act
seeks to protect endangered and threatened animals from the
dangers included in the Secretary's definition of "harm."' The
Court noted that cases decided since the 1973 Act was passed
demonstrate that the intent of Congress was to stop the
extinction of animals at whatever cost necessary.3 ' The
Supreme Court explained that the court of appeals'
interpretation of the statute was erroneous in that it failed to
give the word "harm" a meaning of its own.2 In reviewing the
legislative history of the 1973 Act, the Supreme Court found
that the drafters of the 1973 Act meant to protect animals from
the harm caused when humans destroy their habitats.33
Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals'
decision that the Secretary's definition of "harm" is invalid.34
A concurring opinion was filed by Justice O'Connor"5 and a
lengthy dissent by Justice Scalia. 6 The concurring opinion
upheld the Secretary's definition of "harm" because it is limited
to specific acts of habitat modification that caused actual injury
or death to animals.37 Justice O'Connor further noted that the
definition of "harm" is valid under the principles of proximate
causation."
28. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2412. The Ninth Circuit upheld the Secretary's
broad definition of harm in Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 852
F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that sheep which ate and depleted an endangered
bird's habitat constituted 'harm" under the 1973 Act).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2418.
31. Id. at 2413 (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (holding that the 1973
Act authorizes a court to enjoin Congress from building a dam which would eradi-
cate an endangered animal)). In TVA, the Court stated that the plain intent of Con-
gress in passing the Endangered Species Act was "to halt and reverse the trend
toward species extinction, whatever the cost." TVA, 437 U.S. at 184.
32. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2415.
33. id. at 2418. The Supreme Court quoted Senate Reports, House Reports,
and hearings regarding the drafting and enactment of the 1973 Act. Id. at 2416-18.
34. Id. at 2418.
35. 1d (O'Connor, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 2421 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. Id.
37. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2418.
38. Id. at 2420. Justice O'Connor explained that, applying the principles of
proximate causation, a private party will be liable under the Secretary's definition of
harm "only if their habitat-modifying actions proximately cause death or injury to
1256 Vol. 34:1253
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The dissent stated that the Secretary's definition of "harm"
overstepped the intent and purpose of the 1973 Act. 9 Justice
Scalia found that the definition of "harm" provided by the
Secretary in the federal regulation goes beyond the very word it
was meant to define.'0  Justice Scalia emphasized the
discrepancies between the language of the 1973 Act and the
Secretary's definition of "harm."4' The dissent concluded that
the Secretary's definition of "harm" places a heavy economic
burden on the public, especially private landowners, to preserve
the environment of endangered and threatened animals."2
The tension between private property owners and
environmentalists has been present since legislation protecting
endangered animals was first enacted.43  The first
comprehensive species legislation was enacted on October 15,
1966." The purpose of the Endangered Species Preservation
Act of 1966 (the "1966 Act") was "to conserve and protect" the
species of fish and wildlife "threatened with extinction." 5
Enactment of the 1966 Act was prompted by the loss of some
species of animals native to North America. The 1966 Act
directed the Secretary to designate, after consultation with state
representatives and scientists, those animals whose survival was
protected animals." Id.
39. Id. at 2421-22.
40. Id. at 2423-24. Justice Scalia explained that "take" describes a class of
acts done directly and intentionally to particular animals while "harm," when used
to define "take," should have been defined as a specific process of taking. Id.
41. Id. at 2425-26. Justice Scalia noted that the Secretary's use of "harm" con-
tradicts the use of "take" in the 1973 Act. Id. Justice Scalia pointed out another sec-
tion of the 1973 Act concerning habitat modification which specifically limits the
destruction of the environment by federal agencies. Id. at 2425.
42. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2431. Justice Scalia noted that the 1973 Act
places the burden of paying for the preservation of the environment on private land-
owners. Id. The Justice could not find support in the language of the 1973 Act for
placing this burden on the public. Id.
43. See Moerman v. State, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding
that a private property owner is not entitled to compensation from a state for dam-
age caused by endangered animals relocated by the state), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1539 (1994); Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. Verity, 853 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding
that regulations requiring shrimpers to use special equipment to insure the safety of
endangered turtles are valid); Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1988) (hold-
ing that sheep herders who shoot endangered grizzly bears to protect their private
property violate the Endangered Species Act).
44. S. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973), reprinted in 1973
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2990.
45. See Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669,
§ 1(a), 80 Stat. 926. The purpose of the 1966 Act was "to provide a program for the
conservation, protection, restoration, and propagation of selected species of native
fish and wildlife, including migratory birds that are threatened with extinction." Id.
46. Id.
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in jeopardy and whose environments were "threatened with
destruction, drastic modification, or severe curtailment." 7 The
1966 Act authorized the Secretary to create and direct programs
that conserved and restored the populations of those animals
designated as endangered species." Additionally, the 1966 Act
directed the Secretary to acquire lands in order to carry out the
programs that conserved, protected, restored, or propagated
endangered animals."' The 1966 Act strictly prohibited
individuals from disturbing those lands that the Secretary had
designated as wildlife refuges for the protection of animals
threatened with extinction." The 1966 Act prohibited the
taking of endangered animals on federal lands only.5'
The 1966 Act was amended in 1969 in order to strengthen the
federal government's ability to preserve and protect animals
threatened with extinction.52  The Endangered Species
Conservation Act of 1969 (the "1969 Act") increased the federal
government's involvement in the protection of endangered
animals.5" According to the 1969 Act, the Secretary was
directed to compose a list of animals in danger of worldwide
extinction.' The Secretary was directed to create a list of
animals threatened with extinction after consulting with the
Secretary of State, representatives of foreign countries, and
members of interested organizations.55 The 1969 Act provided
four possible causes for an animal's extinction: the destruction of
its environment; the effects of sport or commercial enterprises;
disease or predators; and "other natural or man-made
factors.""' Importing endangered animals from foreign countries
was strictly prohibited by the 1969 Act.57 However, the
47. Id. § 1(c), 80 Stat. at 926.
48. S. REP. No. 307, supra note 44, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2990.
49. § 2(a)-(b), 80 Stat. at 926-27.
50. Id. § 4(c), 80 Stat. at 928. According to the 1966 Act, "no person shall
knowingly disturb, injure, cut, burn, remove, destroy, or possess any real or personal
property" within the areas designated by the Secretary. Id.
51. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 175 (1978) (holding that the 1973 Act autho-
rizes a court to enjoin Congress from building a dam which would eradicate an
endangered animal). "Taking" was defined in the 1966 Act as "to pursue, hunt,
shoot, capture, collect, kill, or attempt to pursue, hunt, shoot, capture, collect, or
kill." § 5(b), 80 Stat. at 929.
52. S. REP. No. 307, supra note 44, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2990-91.
53. TVA, 437 U.S. at 175.
54. Id.
55. Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, § 3(a),
83 Stat. 275.
56. Id.
57. Id. § 2, 83 Stat. at 275. The Secretary was directed to promote the protec-
tion of endangered animals found in foreign countries. See A.E. Nettleton Co. v. Dia-
1258 Vol. 34:1253
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Secretary did have the power to issue permits to import
endangered animals for scientific, educational, or zoological
purposes."8  According to the 1969 Act, any person who
delivered, carried, transported, or shipped an endangered animal
for commercial or non-commercial purposes or caused that
animal to be sold, taken, or transported was subject to a
maximum fine of $5000 for each violation.59 The 1969 Act also
provided for an increase in funds available to the Secretary for
purchasing lands used for the conservation, protection, and
restoration of endangered animals."
In A.E. Nettleton Co. v. Diamond,6' the Court of Appeals of
New York addressed the issue of whether the 1969 Act
preempted state environmental laws, thus invalidating New
York state laws prohibiting the sale and transportation of
endangered animals.62 The court cited the language of the 1969
Act and held that it specifically allowed for the enforcement of
state laws protecting endangered animals. 3 The court found
that there was no conflict between the 1969 Act and the New
York state laws and, therefore, the 1969 Act did not preempt
state laws." The court concluded that, under the 1969 Act
states had the responsibility of regulating the transportation,
possession and sale of endangered animals within their
jurisdictions."5
mond, 264 N.E.2d 118 (N.Y.) (holding that the 1969 Act specifically allowed for the
enforcement of state laws regulating the protection of endangered animals), appeal
dismissed, 401 U.S. 969 (1970).
58. § 3(b), 83 Stat. at 275-76.
59. Id. §§ 43(a)(2), 43(c)(1), 83 Stat. at 279.
60. S. REP. No. 307, supra note 44, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2991.
61. 264 N.E.2d 118 (N.Y. 1970).
62. Nettleton, 264 N.E.2d at 120-21. The A.E. Nettleton Company challenged
New York state laws known as the Harris Law and the Mason Law. Id. at 119-20.
The Harris Law prohibited the "importation, transportation, possession or sale of any
endangered species." Id. The Mason Law provided that "no part of the skin or body"
of animals listed in the statute could be sold. Id. at 120. The A.E. Nettleton Compa-
ny was involved in the manufacture and sale of alligator and crocodile skin foot-
wear. Id. The crocodile had been listed as an animal protected by New York state
law. Id.
63. Id. at 122. The court cited the following language of the 1969 Act: "Any
person who sells or causes to be sold in interstate or foreign commerce any products
manufactured, made, or processed from any wildlife taken ... in violation of any
law or regulation of a State" shall be subject to the penalties. Id. (citing § 43(bX2),
83 Stat. at 279).
64. Id. at 122-23. The court specifically found that compliance with the 1969
Act and the New York state laws was not an impossibility, notwithstanding the fact
that the New York laws listed animals not included on the federal list. Id. at 124.
65. Id at 123-24. The court concluded that the 1969 Act provided a means for
protecting animals threatened with worldwide extinction. Id. The court held that
states have to assume the responsibility of protecting the endangered animals within
1996 1259
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In 1973, Congress amended the 1969 Act in order to better
protect and preserve endangered animals." The Senate
reported that the Department of the Interior had encountered
some difficulties in protecting endangered animals under the
1969 Act.67 During hearings in 1973, Congress was informed
that despite the 1969 Act, species were becoming extinct at a
rate of one per year.6"
The 1973 Act, in its final form, was the most comprehensive
legislation aimed at protecting animals enacted by any nation at
the time.69 The 1973 Act has three purposes: conservation of
the "ecosystems" of endangered and threatened species; creation
of a program for the conservation of threatened and endangered
animals; and achievement of the goals of treaties entered into
with other countries concerning animals threatened with
extinction.70 According to the 1973 Act, the Secretary is to
denote the animals listed as either "threatened"7" or
"endangered."72  The 1973 Act prohibits all importations,
takings, possessions, exportations, deliveries, and sales of
endangered animals. 73 Pursuant to the 1973 Act, the Secretary
is granted the broad authority to develop federal regulations and
programs to preserve and protect threatened and endangered
animals.74
In United States v. Kepler,75 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was faced with the issue of
whether the 1973 Act is unconstitutional because it effected the
taking of endangered animals from individuals without just
compensation. 6 The court cited provisions of the 1973 Act and
their jurisdiction in order to "assure the continued survival" of those animals. Id.
66. S. REP. No- 93-307, supra note 44, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A-N. at 2991.
The Senate reported that the President had stated that the 1969 Act "simply [did]
not provide the kind of management tools needed to act early enough to save a
vanishing species." Id.
67. Id.
68. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 176 (1978).
69. TVA, 437 U.S. at 180.
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
71. A threatened animal is one likely to become extinct in its natural habitat
in the "foreseeable future." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20).
72. An endangered animal is defined as one in danger of becoming extinct
throughout its natural habitat. 16 U.S.C § 1532(6).
73. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1).
74. TVA, 437 U.S. at 180. According to section 1553(d) of the 1973 Act, the
Secretary "shall issue such regulations as he deems necessary and advisable to pro-
vide for the conservation of such species." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d).
75. 531 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1976).
76. Kepler, 531 F.2d at 796-97. In Kepler, authorities confiscated the hides of
endangered animals transported by Kepler. Id. at 796. The authorities apprehended
Kepler while transporting a cougar and leopard from Florida to Kentucky. Id. Kepler
1260 Vol. 34:1253
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found that Kepler's constitutional rights had not been
violated." The court explained that the 1973 Act is
constitutional because it prohibits only interstate and foreign
sales of all endangered animals.7" The court further noted that
Kepler could have obtained a permit from the Secretary for the
transport of the endangered animals for scientific purposes or to
better the animals' chances of survival. 9 The court concluded
that Congress has the authority under the 1973 Act to regulate
the transportation and sale of endangered animals in interstate
and foreign commerce.8"
In TVA v. Hill,81 the Supreme Court was faced with the issue
of whether the construction of a dam, funded by the federal
government and near completion, should be halted when the
project is found to harm an endangered animal and destroy that
animal's environment.82 The Court held that the purpose of the
1973 Act is to protect and preserve endangered animals, and, in
TVA, this outweighed the monetary value of the dam project
funded by the federal government. 3 To support this finding,
the Court cited the extensive power given to the Secretary by
the 1973 Act and the broad language of the 1973 Act itself." In
its analysis, the Court pointed to the language of the 1973 Act
which requires federal agencies to preserve and protect
had failed to apply for any state permit allowing transportation of endangered ani-
mals across state lines. Id.
77. Id. at 797. The court held that Kepler's Fifth Amendment rights had not
been violated because the 1973 Act does not prevent all sales of endangered ani-
mals. Id. The Fifth Amendment right raised by Kepler was that "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." See U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
78. Kepler, 531 F.2d at 797. The court found that Kepler could have sold the
animals in Florida without fear of prosecution under the 1973 Act. Id.
79. Id. The court discussed section 1539(1)(A) of the 1973 Act which allows
the Secretary to permit the transportation of endangered animals for "scientific pur-
poses or to enhance the propagation or survival of the affected species." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1539(1XA) (1988).
80. Kepler, 531 F.2d at 797. The court further held that the authorities' taking
of the animals from Kepler was not a taking of property in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. Id. (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (hold-
ing that an ordinance will not be found unconstitutional solely on the basis that it
deprives property of its most beneficial use)).
81. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
82. TVA, 437 U.S. at 156. The construction of the Tellico Dam was found to
endanger the existence of a small fish known as the snail darter. Id. at 161. The
snail darter had been added to the list of endangered species shortly after the pas-
sage of the 1973 Act. Id.
83. Id. at 184-85. The Court found that "the plain intent of Congress in enact-
ing [the 1973 Act] was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction,
whatever the cost." Id. at 184.
84. Id. at 180.
1996 1261
Duquesne Law Review
endangered and threatened animals when carrying out their
programs and projects.85 The Court held that the 1973 Act
prohibits all individuals, including federal agencies, from
"taking" endangered and threatened species as defined by the
1973 Act.8" The Supreme Court concluded that Congress
intended the 1973 Act to prevent the extinction of all
endangered animals at "whatever the cost."
8 7
In 1982, the 1973 Act was again amended to provide more
effective protection for endangered animals." The 1973 Act was
amended in order to quicken the process by which the Secretary
lists an animal as endangered or threatened.89 During the
hearings held prior to the enactment of the 1982 Amendments to
the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (the "1982 Amendments"),
Congress learned that only two animals had completed the
proposal and listing process since 1981.90 In order to reduce
confusion, the 1982 Amendments eliminated all references to
economic considerations from the listing process.9 Economic
growth and development was to be considered by the Secretary
only when determining the "critical habitat" of an endangered
animal.92 The Secretary was to define the "critical habitat" for
each animal when that species was determined to be
endangered.93 Under the 1982 Amendments, "critical habitat" is
defined as the areas occupied by an endangered or threatened
animal that are essential to preserving that animal and thus
require special protection. 4 If an endangered animal loses its
"critical habitat," that animal's chances for long-term survival
85. Id. at 183-84. According to section 1536 of the 1973 Act, all federal agen-
cies "in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, utilize their
authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this Act by carrying out programs for
the conservation of endangered species and threatened species." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(aX1).
86. TVA, 437 U.S. at 184-85.
87. Id.
88. H.R. REP. No. 97-567, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.AN. 2807, 2808. The 1982 amendments also authorize appropriations neces-
sary for carrying out the 1973 Act for the fiscal years of 1983, 1984, and 1985. Id.
See Endangered Species Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 2(aX3XA), 96
Stat. 1411.
89. H.R. Rep. No. 97-567, supra note 88, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.N. at
2808.
90. Id. at 2811. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1988).
91. Id. at 2811-12.
92. Id.
93. § 2(aX3)(A), 96 Stat. at 1411. According to the 1982 Amendments: "The
Secretary, by regulation ... shall, concurrently with making a determination under
paragraph (1) that an endangered species or a threatened species, designate any
habitat of such species which is then considered to be critical habitat." Id.
94. § 2(bX2), 96 Stat. at 1411-12. See also 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d).
1262 Vol. 34:1253
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sharply decrease." The Secretary must consider possible
economic consequences before defining the critical habitat of an
endangered animal.9 6
In Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land & Resources,97 the
United States District Court for the District of Hawaii had to
decide whether animals which destroyed the critical habitat of
an endangered animal, the Palila bird, was a harmful taking of
the bird under the 1973 Act, as amended in 1982.98 The court
held that habitat modification, as defined by the 1973 Act, which
prevents an endangered animal from improving its chances for
survival is a harmful taking. To support this holding, the
court cited the definition of "harm" set forth by the Secretary in
198 1 ."c The Secretary's definition of "harm" includes any act,
such as habitat modification, that harms or kills wildlife. 1 '
Evaluating the facts of the case, the court found that the sheep's
feeding habits decreased the Palila's food supply, thus harming
the endangered bird.0 2 The court concluded that the broad
purpose of the 1973 Act-to protect endangered animals and to
preserve their "ecosystems'-mandates that the destruction of
an endangered animal's habitat is considered a violation of the
1973 Act.
103
In'Sierra Club v. Lyng,"4 the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas had to decide if the
management activities of the United States Forest Service
constituted a "taking" of an endangered species.' °5 The court
held that federal agencies, while carrying out their programs,
are bound to protect and conserve endangered animals."o The
95. 43 Fed. Reg. 874, 874-75 (1978).
96. § 2(bX2), 96 Stat. at 1412.
97. 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986).
98. Palila, 649 F. Supp. at 1072. In Palila, environmentalists sought an in-
junction requiring authorities to remove sheep from the Pala bird's critical habitat.
Id. at 1071-72. The environmentalists claimed that the sheep's destruction of the
bird's environment was a "taking" as defined by the 1973 Act. Id.
99. Id. at 1077.
100. Id.
101. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1993).
102. Palita, 649 F. Supp. at 1078-79.
103. Id. at 1077.
104. 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988).
105. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. at 1269. The Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society
claimed that actions taken by the Forest Service to reduce forest areas decreased
the food supply and available shelter for the red-cockaded woodpecker, an endan-
gered animal. Id. at 1262, 1266. The environmentalists argued that this constituted
a "taking" under the 1973 Act. Id.
106. Id. at 1270 (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978)). See supra notes
81-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of TVA.
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court found that federal agencies are bound by the 1973 Act to
refrain from any activity that harms an endangered animal."7
The court further found that the practices of the Forest Service
had harmed the endangered animal because the agency's actions
led to the destruction of an animal's habitat, the decrease of the
animal's food supply and the disturbance of the animal's
behavioral patterns."8  The court concluded that federal
agencies, like all individuals, are bound by the 1973 Act to
refrain from all actions, including habitat modification, that
harm endangered animals.0 9
In Louisiana ex. rel. Guste v. Verity,"' the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was faced with the issue of
whether regulations that require shrimpers to use special
equipment in order to preserve endangered and threatened
turtles are burdensome to their businesses."' The court held
that the regulations protecting the turtles are valid, despite the
shrimpers' arguments concerning the cost to them of adhering to
the regulations."' The court reasoned that loss of endangered
animals is far more important than any economic loss suffered
by the shrimping industry."' The court concluded that the
Secretary has the discretion to issue regulations necessary to
protect an endangered or threatened animal."4
In Christy v. Hodel,"' the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit was faced with the issue of whether the
destruction of an endangered animal in order to protect private
property is a violation of the 1973 Act."" The court held that
107. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. at 1270 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1993)). The court
cited federal regulations in which the Secretary of the Interior defines harm as "an
act [that] may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actu-
ally kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns."
Id.
108. Id. at 1271-72.
109. Id. at 1270-71.
110. 853 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1988)
111. Guste, 853 F.2d at 327. Shrimpers claimed that regulations requiring them
to use "turtle excluder devices" or to limit their trawling time in order to protect
endangered or threatened turtles are "arbitrary and capricious." Id. The shrimpers
also argued that the evidence presented by the Environmental Defense Fund and the
Center for Environmental Education was insufficient to support the regulations. Id.
112. Id. at 331.
113. Id. (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 179 (1978)).
114. Id. at 333. The court cited the language of section 1533(d) of the 1973
Act, which states: "The Secretary shall issue such regulations as he deems necessary
and advisable to provide for the conservation of such species." 16 U.S.C. § 1553(d).
115. 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1988).
116. Christy, 857 F.2d at 1326. Christy was instituted by Richard P. Christy,
Thomas B. Guthrie and Ira Pertrins, three sheep herders who each claimed that
their sheep had been destroyed by grizzly bears. Id. at 1327-28. The grizzly bear
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sheep herders who had destroyed endangered grizzly bears to
protect livestock had violated the 1973 Act by causing harm to
an endangered species, despite the possible harm or loss of
private property."17 The court reasoned that, because the 1973
Act does not list defense of private property as an exception to
its prohibitions, the sheep herders' shooting of the bears to
protect their livestock was a violation of the 1973 Act. 18 The
court opined that the federal regulation forbidding the killing of
grizzly bears is reasonable because it provides for other methods
of protecting sheep from grizzly bears." 9 The court promptly
dismissed the sheep herders' claim that the destruction of their
animals by the grizzly bears, an animal protected by the 1973
Act, was an unlawful taking by the federal government. 2 ' The
court concluded that any loss of private property that occurs due
to the actions of an endangered species is the "incidental result
of reasonable regulation."'
In Moerman v. State, 2' the Court of Appeals of California
was faced with the issue of whether the State of California was
responsible for damage to private property caused by
endangered animals relocated by the State. 2' The court of
appeals held that the State was not responsible for damage
caused by relocated endangered tule elk to Moerman's
property."4 The court reasoned that the State was not
responsible for the damage to Moerman's property because the
elk were wild animals and not, therefore, within the control of
the State. 25 The court concluded that states are not liable for
was listed as a threatened animal in 1987. Id. Christy shot two grizzly bears in
order to protect his livestock. Id. Christy claimed that the grizzly bears had de-
stroyed approximately $1200 worth of his livestock. Id.
117. Id. at 1330-31.
118. Id. at 1329.
119. Id. at 1331. The federal regulation requires that private property owners,
when threatened by an endangered animal, may request the help of "experienced
government officials." ld.
120. Id. at 1334. The court held that the regulations are valid because they do
not take or regulate individuals' private property. Id. The court noted other cases
holding that the destruction of private property by animals protected by federal or
state laws do not constitute an illegal "taking" by the government. Id. See Jordan v.
State, 681 P.2d 346 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
121. Christy, 857 F.2d at 1335.
122. 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1539
(1994).
123. Moerman, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 331. Moerman brought suit against the State of
California after the State relocated endangered tule elk. Id. The relocated tule elk
ate crops meant for Moerman's livestock and damaged Moerman's private property.
Id. Moerman sued the State for the damage to his property. Id.
124. Id. at 332-34.
125. Id. The court dismissed Moerman's argument that the State exerted con-
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any damage to private property caused by animals protected by
the 1973 Act. 2 '
The tension between supporters of private property rights and
individuals wanting to protect wildlife has recently culminated
in Congress. Cases such as Palila, Lyng, Guste, Christy,
Moerman and Sweet Home, which favor the rights of endangered
animals over those of property owners, have angered many
private landowners, farmers, and businesses.127 Critics of such
cases claim that enforcement of the 1973 Act is extreme and
prevents private individuals from using property as they
wish.'28 One critic of the 1973 Act noted: 'e now have a
situation where the needs of blue-eyed salamanders and blind
spiders take precedence over the need of American families."'29
On September 7, 1995, a bill was proposed that would amend
the Endangered Species Act of 1973 to better accommodate the
property rights of private landowners.' 0 The bill proposes that
the Secretary enter into "cooperative agreements" with private
landowners who own property on which an endangered or
threatened animal is found.'3 ' The amendment limits the
definition of "harm" to direct actions against an endangered
animal that cause physical injury.'32 This definition of "harm"
would overrule the holding of Sweet Home, which interpreted
the definition of "harm" as including acts against an endangered
animal's habitat. 13 Supporters of the Endangered Species Act
have expressed displeasure with the proposed bill."M According
to Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior, if Noah would have
had to operate under the proposed amendments to the 1973 Act,
"he wouldn't have needed an ark, he could have fit all the
animals he was allowed to save in a canoe."
135
trol over the elk by moving the animals onto his property. Id. at 332.
126. Id. at 332 (citing Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1334 (9th Cir. 1988)).
127. Government & Commerce: Endangered Species Act, CONGRESSIONAL QUAR-
TERLY WEEKLY REPORT, Sept. 5, 1995 [hereinafter Government & Commerce].
128. Government & Commerce, supra note 127.
129. Bill Would Reform Species Act, UPI, Sept. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS,
NEXIS Library, UPI File [hereinafter Bill Would Reform].
130. Margaret Kriz, The Showdown Over Endangered Species, 27 NAT'L J., Sept.
16, 1995, at 2315. One of the findings made by Congress is that: "As more species
have been threatened by natural and human factors, conservation of those species
has increasingly relied on habitat protection efforts on both public and private land."
H.R. 2374, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(5) (1995).
131. H.R. 2374, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § (8)(D)(1).
132. Bipartisan Bid to Revamp Endangered Species Act Introduced in the House,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1995, at 3.





The proposed amendments to the 1973 Act are expected to be
fiercely debated in Congress during 1996.136 The decision in
Sweet Home and the cases leading up to it have sparked a
violent debate between private property owners and
environmentalists. The debates in Congress concerning the
amendments to the 1973 Act will pit business and industry
against environmentalists. Members of the timber, mining and
ranching industries have joined together to form interest groups
and coalitions in preparation for the upcoming debates. 7
Environmentalists have united to defend the 1973 Act against
businesses and industries.3 ' Sadly, the future of the
Endangered Species Act, and the animals it strives to preserve,
may depend upon money and the political strength of interest
groups and industry.
Lee Ann Kosakowski
136. Kriz, supra note 130, at 2315.
137. Id. Groups such as the National Endangered Species Act Reform Coalition,
the Endangered Species Coordinating Council, the Grassroots ESA Coalition, and the
American Land Rights Association are lobbying for the reforms to the Endangered
Species Act. Id.
138. id. The Endangered Species Coalition, President Clinton, and Vice Presi-
dent Gore support the present Endangered Species Act. Id.
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